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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper in the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellants have raised four issues on appeal: 
I. Whether the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' 
action is within its discretion when Plaintiffs moved for and 
received a continuance over the objections of Defendants, had 
notice of the dates of trial, and failed to appear at the trial. 
A trial court's dismissal of an action with prejudice for 
failure to prosecute is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rohan 
v. Boseman, 2002 UT App. 109, 31 15, 46 P.3d 753. 
II. Whether the district court's denial of a motion to set 
aside under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was 
within its discretion. 
A trial court's denial of a motion to set aside is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 1 54, 
150 P.3d 480. 
III. Whether the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' 
motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure was within its discretion. 
A trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 2003 
UT 41, f 25, 82 P.3d 1064. 
IV. Whether the district court's award of attorney fees 
based on its inherent powers was within its discretion. 
A trial court's award of attorney fees is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. S_ee Rohan, 2002 UT 109, at 1 34-35. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of or of central importance to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal stems from an action filed by Plaintiffs 
claiming damages against Defendants for negligence and 
conversion of Plaintiffs' property (R. at 1-13). The complaint 
was filed on March 3, 2006. The parties completed their initial 
pleadings and a Rule 26 scheduling order was entered by the 
district court on May 31, 2006 (R. at 49-50). The order set a 
fact discovery deadline of November 6, 2006 (R. at 50). This 
date was later extended to February 28, 2007 (R. at 217, 223-
25). 
As part of their discovery, Defendant John Siddoway's 
counsel, Randy Ludlow sought to depose Plaintiff Lonnie Paulos 
and his assistant and agent, Rhonda Jones (R. at 226-27, 228-
29). Plaintiffs moved for a protective order against these 
depositions, claiming that Plaintiffs' counsel, Richard Nemelka, 
had a conflict and that the deposition should be conducted 
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telephonically because both witnesses relocated to Houston, 
Texas during the pendency of the action (R. at 230-34). Mr. 
Ludlow responded that the original dates had been set up with 
Mr. Nemelka previous to the notices of deposition being filed 
and that Mr. Nemelka was already informed that a telephonic 
deposition would be unacceptable (R. at 235-37). Plaintiffs7 
motion was set for hearing on March 19, 2007 (R.249-51). 
Plaintiffs sought to continue the hearing (R. at 252-53), but 
the district court held the hearing as scheduled. Mr. Nemelka 
failed to appear at that hearing or to send anyone in his place 
(R. at 274). Plaintiffs' motion was denied and Lonnie Paulos was 
ordered to appear in Salt Lake City for a deposition and to 
produce Rhonda Jones as well (R. at 274, 283-85). Plaintiffs 
moved to set the order aside (R. at 279-80) but their motion was 
denied (R. at 281-82) . 
Meanwhile, Defendant All My Sons moved for summary judgment 
on January 10, 2007 (R. at 173-75). Plaintiffs, over a month 
after their response was due, filed for an extension of time to 
file their memorandum in opposition, citing the fact that the 
depositions of Lonnie Paulos and Rhonda Jones, which they sought 
to get a protective order against, had not yet been conducted 
(R. at 254-55). Plaintiffs finally filed their memorandum in 
opposition on May 15, 2007 (R. at 290-313) . 
The matter came before the district court for a scheduling 
conference, and there the court determined based on the 
representation of the parties that the trial would take three 
days. (R. at t).1 The number of witnesses and amount of evidence 
that the parties proposed to offer also supported the conclusion 
that a three-day trial was required (R. at t, 336-37). 
Therefore, the court set the trial for October 15, 16, and 17, 
2008 (R. at t, 336-37). On June 27, Plaintiffs moved to continue 
the trial dates, as Mr. Nemelka was scheduled to play golf at 
the Utah Senior Games in St. George during the time of trial (R. 
at 345-46). Defendant All My Sons submitted a written opposition 
to this motion, arguing that postponing the date of trial would 
prejudice them in a separate case pending between All My Sons 
1. Plaintiffs have failed to obtain the transcript of the 
scheduling conference of June 18, 2007 and the hearing of August 
20, 2007. Because of this failure, and because Rule 11(e) (2) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure do not obligate Defendants 
to correct this failure, Defendants are forced to rely on their 
own recollections of what occurred at the hearing. References to 
occurrences taking place at that hearing will be marked with the 
dagger symbol (t). Secondary references to the hearing contained 
in other portions of the record will also be referred to when 
available. 
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and its former shareholders that was contingent on the outcome 
of the present action (R. at 362-65, 541-50). 
Plaintiffs' motion to continue was heard by the district 
court on August 20, 2008. The court confirmed that three days 
would be needed for trial (R. at t). Mr. Ludlow opposed 
Plaintiffs' motion at that time, as the next available date for 
trial was during a conference in Chicago involving Mr. Ludlow's 
wife that Mr. Ludlow planned to attend, and that the next date 
that the court had available for trial would be in 2008. (R. at 
t, 643-44). Mr. Ludlow informed the Court that continuing the 
trial into 2008 was not acceptable under numerous issues, and he 
dropped his objection and agreed to forego the conference when 
Mr. Nemelka indicated that Plaintiffs would not oppose 
continuing the trial until 2008 (R. at t, 477, 644). The 
district court granted Plaintiffs' motion and continued the 
trial to November 5, 6, and 7, 2007 (R. at 375) . All counsel 
were at the hearing, and the dates were agreed to by all parties 
in open court (R. at t, 375). Defendant All My Sons' counsel, 
Stephen Spencer, made a statement on the record after the 
court's decision that it was important to Defendant that no 
further continuances should be granted, as putting on 
Defendant's evidence at the trial would require the service of 
several subpoenas to persons who had no incentive to be there 
and would not be easily persuaded to accommodate their schedules 
more than once (R. at t, 552). 
Both parties prepared for trial. Mr. Nemelka sent a trial 
subpoena to Jerry Erkelens (R. at 422), and successfully moved 
for the admission of Rhonda Jones' deposition into evidence in 
lieu of her testimony (R. at 483-84). Mr. Ludlow sent a trial 
subpoena to Judy Hicks (R. at 419). Mr. Spencer sent trial 
subpoenas to Officers Aaron Jones and Mike Obrey (R. at 379, 
381, 385), Rob Herrera (R. at 389), Marko Mufioz (R. at 394), 
Alfredo Villegas Munoz (R. at 402), and Hector Pineda (R. at 
407) . 
Apparently, Mr. Nemelka misremembered the date of trial. 
Mr. Nemelka calendared the dates of trial as November 6, 7, and 
8, 2007 (R. at 478) , rather than the actual Gates of November 5, 
6, and 7, 2007. He also told his client that the trial was on 
the incorrect dates (R. at 480, 492, 522). Mr. Nemelka further 
filed a proposed order admitting a deposition in lieu of witness 
testimony that contained the incorrect dates and was later 
signed by the district court (R. at 483-84). Plaintiffs' trial 
subpoena also indicated that the witness should appear on 
November 6, 2008 (R. at 422). 
Defendants also submitted several documents that indicated 
the dates of trial. Defendant John Siddoway's subpoena indicated 
that the witness should appear November 5, 6, and 7, 2007 (R. at 
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419). Defendant All My Sons subpoenas indicated that the 
witnesses would be required on November 6 and 7, 2007, as they 
were not needed during the presentation of Plaintiffs' case-in-
chief (R. at 379, 381, 385, 389, 394, 402, 407). On November 2, 
Mr. Spencer hand-delivered a copy of Defendant's Trial Brief to 
Mr. Nemelka, which listed the dates of trial as November 5, 6, 
and 7 (R. at 430, 537) . 
Mr. Spencer and Mr. Nemelka also had a conversation 
regarding the dates of trial. On October 31, 2007, Mr. Spencer 
called Mr. Nemelka to inquire as to jury instructions (R. at 
479, 537). During that conversation, Mr. Spencer indicated that 
the trial began Monday the 5th, and Mr. Nemelka responded that 
trial began Tuesday the 6th (R. at 479, 537). Mr. Spencer 
confirmed the date on XChange and telephoned Mr. Nemelka's 
office to tell him that he was mistaken as to the dates, and 
left a message with Mr. Nemelka's receptionist to that effect 
(R. at 537). Meanwhile, Mr. Nemelka contacted the district court 
to inquire as to whether the trial was set for a jury, but did 
not inquire as to the date of trial (R. at 479-80). Mr. Spencer, 
when he hand-delivered his trial brief to Mr. Nemelka on 
November 2, 2007, told Mr. Nemelka that the trial was to 
commence on November 5, 2007 and that he should check the trial 
date (R. at 537). 
On the morning of November 5, 2001, Mr. Ludlow, Mr. 
Siddoway, and Mr. Spencer were at the court (R. at 673). Neither 
Mr. Nemelka nor Plaintiffs were in attendance (R. at 673). The 
district court attempted to locate Mr. Nemelka and discovered 
that Mr. Nemelka was trying a case in Bountiful (R. at 673). Mr. 
Ludlow and Mr. Spencer noted that they had both spent 
considerable time and money preparing for trial (R. at 673), and 
they moved that the court dismiss the action and award attorney 
fees, which the court granted (R. at 446, 469-71, 673). The 
written order dismissing the action and awarding attorney fees 
upon affidavit was entered as per Rule 58A on November 7, 2007 
(R. at 469-71). Defendants filed an affidavit of costs and 
attorney fees (R. at 454-68, 499-511), and judgment was entered 
against Plaintiffs on January 9, 2008 (R. at 584-86, 597-89) . 
Plaintiffs filed a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the order 
of dismissal and the award for attorney fees on November 8, 2007 
(R. at 474-75). The court entered a minute entry denying this 
motion on January 7, 2008 (R. at 582-83) and entered an order as 
per Rule 58A on January 30, 2008, which found that (1) 
Plaintiffs failed to show that they exercised reasonable care in 
ascertaining the trial date, (2) the award of attorney fees was 
justified under the authority of the court to control 
proceedings in front of it, and (3) that the attorney fees were 
reasonable charges for necessary work (R. at 637-39). 
8 
Plaintiffs filed another post-trial motion, this time a 
motion for new trial under Rule 59, on January 11, 2008 (R. at 
594-95). The pleading contained virtually identical arguments to 
Plaintiffs' previous motion to set aside (Compare R. at 514-20 
with R. at 596-615). Plaintiffs also moved to stay enforcement 
of the judgment (R. at 590-91). The court again denied 
Plaintiffs' motion, entering a ruling as per Rule 58A on 
February 26, 2008 (R.642-47). In that ruling, the court 
explained that because Mr. Nemelka was at the hearing where the 
date of trial was set, other parties had made significant 
sacrifices to accommodate Mr. Nemelka's schedule, Mr. Spencer 
had informed him personally of the date of trial, and that the 
trial could not have been reasonably rescheduled, there was no 
irregularity of proceedings or abuse of discretion that would 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 59 (R. at 642-47). Plaintiffs 
filed a notice of appeal on February 29, 2008 (R. at 659-60) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' appeal fails for three reasons: this court 
lacks jurisdiction, Plaintiffs have failed to marshal the 
evidence, and the trial court was within its discretion. Three 
of Plaintiffs' four issues on appeal are not properly before the 
Court because Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was a 
successive post-judgment motion that did not toll the time to 
appeal under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Also, 
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Plaintiffs have failed to marshal the evidence supporting the 
trial court's orders. The failure of the appealing party to 
marshal the evidence means that a trial court must conclude that 
the trial court's orders are supported by substantial evidence 
and not an abuse of discretion. Finally, the trial court acted 
within its discretion in all of its orders. Plaintiffs' conduct 
in pursuing the litigation manifested delay and reckless 
scheduling practices, as well as a lack of reasonable care in 
ascertaining the correct date for trial. Balanced against 
prejudice to Defendants, it is clear that the trial court was 
within its discretion in dismissing the action, denying 
Plaintiffs' motions, and awarding attorney fees. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEALS OF THE 
LOWER COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING THE ACTION, THE DENIAL OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND THE AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES; THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE APPEAL OF THESE 
ISSUES. 
Defendants ask the Court to dismiss issues I, III, and IV 
for lack of jurisdiction.2 Under the Utah Rules of Appellate 
2. Defendants note that they filed a motion for summary 
disposition with substantially similar arguments on April 1, 
2008. While the Court denied Defendant's motion in an order 
dated April 15, 2008, the order provided no analysis for why the 
motion was denied. Defendants submit that the most likely reason 
10 
Procedure, an order may only be appealed if it is a final order, 
Utah R. App. P. 3, and if a notice of appeal is filed within 
thirty days of the date of the order. Utah R. App. P. 4. The 
appellate court has no jurisdiction to review an order that has 
not been timely appealed. Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT 
App. 299, SI 7, 13 P. 3d 616. A subsequent appealable order is 
separate and does not give the court jurisdiction to decide the 
merits of previous final orders. See Franklin Covey Client Sales 
v. Melvin, 2000 UT App. 110, 519, 2 P. 3d 451 (holding that an 
appeal on a denial of a motion to set aside under 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not give the court 
jurisdiction to reach the merits of the underlying judgment). 
The time for a judgment that includes attorney fees and 
costs runs from the day a judgment for a sum certain has been 
entered. Promax Development Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, SI15, 998 
P. 2d 254. Therefore, an appeal from the order of dismissal and 
for the denial was that the motion purported to dispose of less 
than all the issues appealed by Plaintiff, and so would be 
formally insufficient under Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. At any rate, the denial does not appear to 
analyze the merits of Defendants' motion, and so the 
jurisdiction of issues I, III, and IV should be reviewed by this 
Court. 
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the judgments for attorney fees and costs must have been filed 
by February 8, 2008, unless the time was tolled by the 
appropriate filing of one of five post-judgment motions: a Rule 
24 or 59 motion for a new trial, a 50(b) motion for judgment, a 
rule 59 motion to amend the judgment, or a Rule 52 motion to 
amend or make additional findings of fact. Utah R. App. P. 4(b). 
If this motion is improperly brought, it does not toll the time 
for appeal. Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 
1987). 
Plaintiffs' Rule 59 motion was an improper second post-
judgment motion and so does not toll the time for filing an 
appeal under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Once a post-judgment motion has been filed and decided by the 
trial court, a second post-judgment motion for relief is 
improper and so does not toll the time for appeal. Arnica Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah App. 1989). This 
is a well-settled rule, recognized by federal and state courts. 
See, e.g., Venable v. Haislip, 721 F.2d 297, 299 (10th Cir. 
1983); Bank Trust Co. v. Griffin, 963 So. 2d 106, 109 (Ala. 
2007); Wenzoski v. Central Banking System, Inc., 736 P.2d 753 
(Cal. 1987); Sears v. Sears, 422 N.E.2d 610, 612 (111. App. 
1981); Mollett v. Trustmark Ins. Co., 134 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 2003); State ex rel. Douglas v. Bible Baptist Church of 
Lincoln, 353 N.W.2d 20 (Neb. 1984); Kaufman v. Oregonian Pub. 
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Co. , 245 P.2d 237 (Or. 1952); Elam v. South Carolina Dept. of 
Transp. , 602 S.E.2d 772 (S.C. 2004); Gassaway v. Patty, 604 
S.W.2d 60 (Tenn. App. Ct. 1980). 
In this case, Plaintiffs filed a 60 (b) motion to set aside 
the judgment on November 8, 2007. The filing and denial of this 
motion prevented any successive post-judgment motions from 
tolling the time for appeal. Thus, the Rule 59 motion for a new 
trial or to amend the judgment did not toll the time for appeal; 
the deadline for filing a notice of appeal challenging the order 
of November 7, 2007 and the judgment for attorney fees and costs 
that was entered by the Court clerk on January 9, 2008 was 
February 8, 2008.3 
Plaintiffs have argued previously that the rule against 
successive post-judgment motions does not apply to this case 
because Plaintiffs' 60(b) motion was filed before the judgment 
date of January 8, 2008. This argument misses the point of the 
rule. The purpose of the rule against successive post-judgment 
motions is to promote the finality of judgments and to force a 
litigant to present all of its arguments at once. Watkiss & 
3
 A motion to set aside the order under Rule 60(b) does not toll 
the time for filing an appeal. Utah R. App. P. 4(b); Watkiss & 
Campbell v. FOA & SON, 808 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, 
J., Dissenting). 
Campbell v. FOA & Sons, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1991); Maverik 
Country Stores v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 944, 951 nn. 
9-10 (Utah App. 1993); Arnica, 768 P.2d at 969. There is no basis 
for allowing a litigant to engage in tactics after the decision 
but before the entry of judgment when those same tactics are 
prohibited after the entry of judgment. There is nothing about a 
written entry under Rule 58A that would change the policy basis 
behind the rule. Under Plaintiffs' interpretation, any litigant 
could make two motions for relief from the judgment so long as 
they file one of them before the written entry of judgment. 
Allowing for jurisdiction in this case would open a gaping 
loophole in the policy against successive post-judgment motions. 
Also, Plaintiffs' argument is incorrect on its facts; 
Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion was filed subsequent to judgment 
in this case. Plaintiffs' 60(b) motion was filed after the order 
of November 7, 2007, which was a judgment for purposes of Rule 
54. An order is final and appealable if the order determines the 
substantive rights of the parties and terminates the litigation. 
Code v. Utah Dept. of Health, 2006 UT App. 113, 13, 133 P.3d 
438; Harris v. IES Assocs., 2003 UT App. 112, 156, 69 P.3d 297. 
The order of November 7 struck the pleadings of the Plaintiffs, 
dismissed the action with prejudice, and ordered Plaintiffs to 
pay Defendants' attorney's fees. The order was therefore a final 
determination of the substantive rights of the parties and a 
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declaration of the endpoint of the litigation. While the 
effective date of the judgment is January 9 for reasons of 
judicial economy, see Promax, 2000 UT 4, at 5115, it is obvious 
that Plaintiffs could have appealed from the order of November 
7. Hence, the 60(b) motion filed November 8 is a post-judgment 
motion. 
Third, whether a motion is a post-judgment motion is 
determined by the relief requested, not by the time at which the 
motion was filed. A post-judgment motion, of which Rule 59 and 
60(b) are two classic examples, seeks relief from a final 
judgment or order of the court. Black's Law Dictionary does not 
define a post-judgment motion, but defines its synonym, post-
trial motion, as a u[g]eneric term to describe those motions 
which are permitted after trial such as motion for new trial and 
motion for relief from judgment." Black's Law Dictionary 809 
(Abr. 6th ed. 1991). Thus, even if Rule 60(b) were read to allow 
motions to set aside an interlocutory order (as Plaintiffs have 
suggested in the past), Plaintiffs' 60(b) motion does not ask 
for that type of relief. Plaintiffs sought relief not from an 
interlocutory order, but from an order disposing of the 
litigation. Whether that order was filed before or after the 
judgment for attorney fees was entered, the motion is a post-
judgment motion in nature. 
Fourth, attempting to distinguish this case from Arnica by 
saying the motions were made under different rules of civil 
procedure also fails to apprehend the policy behind the rule 
prohibiting successive post-judgment motions. A party must bring 
forward all of its claims for relief at once. As this Court has 
noted in a different context, a party is ''entitled to ^one bite 
of the apple' . . . . That opportunity cannot be expanded into a 
multi-course buffet by such devices as reconsiderations or 
supplemental filings after a motion for review has been 
denied . . . ." Ring v. Industrial Commission, 744 P.2d 602, 604 
(Utah App. 1987). 
Finally, the law-of-the-case doctrine would independently 
defeat jurisdiction in this case. The law-of-the-case doctrine 
dictates that the parties should avoid relitigating the same 
proposition in the same case. Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 
572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977). A motion that seeks to relitigate 
a proposition already ruled upon by the same court is improper. 
Arnica, 768 P.2d at 969. In the present case, Plaintiffs' motion 
for a new trial is nearly identical in substance to its motion 
to set aside the judgment. Both motions rest mainly on one 
argument: that the acts of Plaintiffs' Attorney were reasonable 
and an NXhonest mistake" (compare Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion for New Trial 153-8 (R.597-602), with 
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Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Set Aside 
5SI6-8 (R.516-17) .4 
Plaintiffs clearly had an opportunity to make any and all 
arguments attacking the judgment. That they failed to do so is 
not grounds for making these arguments later. This is clearly a 
case where Plaintiffs' successive post-judgment motions have 
NNunjustif iably prolong [ed] the life of a lawsuit." Arnica, 768 
P.2d at 969. Plaintiffs' Rule 59 motion is therefore improper, 
meaning it did not toll the time for appeal, and the ruling 
denying it should not be reviewable. This Court should dismiss 
the Plaintiffs' appeals of the order to dismiss, the denial of 
4. To the extent there are other arguments in the Rule 59 
motion that are not in the Rule 60(b) motion, it is further 
proof that Plaintiffs should have brought a motion for a new 
trial in the first instance. The grounds for relief are much 
broader in a Rule 59 motion than in a Rule 60(b), likely broad 
enough to encompass any basis for relief under Rule 60(b). 
Hence, the two rules work in tandem: a motion for new trial can 
offer relief for a broad range of reasons; however, it is only 
available for ten days after the entry of the judgment. Rule 
60(b) allows relief for fewer reasons, but it is available for 
three months after the judgment or even longer, depending on the 
grounds for setting aside the judgment. 
the motion for a new trial, and the award of attorney fees for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING 
THE ACTION, THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE, 
THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, AND THE 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
RULING. 
Plaintiffs have failed to marshal the evidence supporting 
the trial court's ruling as required by Rule 24(a)(9) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 24(a)(9) requires that 
"a party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding." This 
standard applies not only to an explicit finding of fact, but 
also to the review of a fact-sensitive determination of a lower 
court that is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United Park v. 
Stichting Mayflower, 2006 UT 35, 1 25, 140 P.3d 1200; Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 1 20, 100 P.3d 1177. To properly marshal 
the evidence, a party is required to 
"temporarily remove its own prejudices and fully 
embrace the adversary's position"; he or she must play 
the "devil's advocate." In so doing, appellants must 
present the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
trial court and not attempt to construe the evidence 
in a light favorable to their case. 
Chen, 2004 UT 82, at 1 78. If a party fails to marshal the 
evidence, the appellate court assumes that the evidence supports 
the trial court's findings and has grounds to affirm the trial 
court's findings on that basis. Id. at 1 80. 
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Plaintiffs' brief does not meet this requirement with 
respect to any of the issues it appeals. Plaintiffs' brief does 
not attempt to list the facts underlying the lower court's 
orders. Plaintiffs' brief does not even include the orders it 
appeals from, as required by Rule 24(a)(11)(C). 
Plaintiffs have also failed to request the transcript for 
the hearing of August 20, 2007, in spite of referring to this 
hearing several times in its brief. An appellant is responsible 
to obtain all transcripts that are relevant to a fact-intensive 
determination by a lower court. Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). The 
failure of an appellant to request these transcripts leaves the 
Court with no choice but to conclude that the record supports 
the lower court's determination. See Horton v. Gem State Mut. of 
Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 1990). 
These omissions leave Defendants and the Court NXto bear the 
expense and time of performing the critical task of marshaling 
the evidence. This is unfair, inefficient, and unacceptable." 
United Park, 2006 UT 35, at 26. This Court should therefore rely 
on Plaintiffs' failure to marshal to affirm the lower court's 
rulings. Because of this unfairness, the Court should also award 
Defendants' reasonable attorney fees for failure to adequately 
brief as per State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App. 170, 72 P.3d 138. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING 
THE ACTION, DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE, 
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DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
A. The trial court's dismissal of the action and its 
denial of the motion for a new trial was within its 
discretion. 
The trial court's dismissal for failure to prosecute is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rohan, 2002 UT 109 at SI 28. In 
addition, the guestion of whether the denial of Plaintiffs' 
motion for a new trial constituted abuse of discretion is 
reviewed by looking at whether the order that the Plaintiffs 
sought to retry under rule 59 constituted an abuse of discretion 
itself. See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429-30 (Utah 1999) 
Defendants will therefore examine these issues in tandem. 
A court has wide discretion to dismiss an action for 
failure to prosecute "if a party fails to move forward according 
to the rules and the directions of the court, without 
justifiable excuse." Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. 
Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 878-79 (Utah 1975). "The 
party challenging the dismissal bears the burden of offering a 
reasonable excuse for his or her lack of diligence."' Rohan, 2002 
UT 109 at 528. In reviewing whether the trial court has abused 
its discretion in dismissing an action for failure to prosecute, 
the appellate court should consider the following factors: (1) 
the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has 
had to move the case forward; (3) what each of the parties has 
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done to move the case forward; (4) what difficulty or prejudice 
may have been caused to the other side; and (5) most important, 
whether injustice may result from the dismissal." Id. 
Under these factors, the trial court was well within its 
discretion to order an involuntary dismissal for failure to 
prosecute. In looking at factors 1 through 3, the court could 
reasonably conclude that the Plaintiffs' conduct to this point 
justified the dismissal. Plaintiffs' failure to appear at trial 
the morning of November 5 was due to a lack of diligence on 
their part and not reasonable under the circumstances. NNDue 
Diligence" has been described as "the prudence and effort that 
is ordinarily used by a reasonable person under the 
circumstances." West's Legal Thesaurus & Dictionary 261 (1985). 
Plaintiffs' conduct does not meet that standard. Mr. Nemelka was 
at the proceedings the day the trial date was set. He had access 
to the docket and court calendar via the internet. Mr. Nemelka 
was actually told by Mr. Spencer that trial started on the 5th. 
Mr. Nemelka received Mr. Spencer's Trial Brief on November 2, 
2007. Mr. Nemelka admits that he was told by Stephen Spencer 
that the trial was scheduled November 5-7. Upon being put on 
notice that he is mistaken about the date of a trial, a 
reasonable attorney would double-check the calendar. 
Additionally, Mr. Spencer called Mr. Nemelka's office to confirm 
that the trial began on November 5, and confirmed it in writing 
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through his trial brief, handed to Mr. Nemelka on November 2. 
Under the circumstances, the reasonable person or attorney would 
conclude that he should question and then verify his 
recollection. Plaintiffs failed to act with due diligence and 
therefore they had no justifiable excuse for missing the trial. 
When looked at in the context of the entire proceedings, 
Plaintiffs' failure to appear at the morning of November 5 
becomes all the more inexcusable. Plaintiffs' conduct during the 
course of the pre-trial proceedings could reasonably be 
interpreted as a pattern of delay, obstruction, and reckless 
scheduling practices. Mr. Nemelka originally agreed to a date 
for the depositions of Mr. Paulos and Ms. Jones, then sought to 
change the date because he had another appointment. Mr. Nemelka 
scheduled a hearing to stop the depositions from moving forward, 
then moved to continue that hearing because of a scheduling 
conflict. When the court failed to grant the continuance, rather 
than send someone in his place, Mr. Nemelka simply failed to 
show up. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs delayed their response to 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment because the depositions 
of Mr. Paulos and Ms. Jones, which they had sought to quash, had 
not yet taken place. In the context of Plaintiffs' multiple 
delays, failures to appear, and multiple double bookings of 
their schedule, the failure to appear at trial may have been the 
point at which the trial court concluded that by not dismissing 
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the case would constitute a failure of the court to manage the 
proceedings of the court and prejudice to the Defendants. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' failure to appear and previous delays 
cannot be laid at the feet of Defendants. Defendants attempted 
to obtain the depositions of Mr. Paulos and Ms. Jones before the 
discovery cutoff date. While there was confusion due to a change 
of counsel and two separate attorneys for Defendants each 
pursuing their own strategies, Defendants sought through 
dispositive motions and motions for trial dates to move the 
proceedings along. That is to be expected because Defendants had 
the most to lose from the delay, as explained below. Mr. Spencer 
declared on the record during the hearing of August 20 that any 
further delay would prejudice his client's ability to put on its 
case. Mr. Ludlow sacrificed his trip to Chicago to avoid 
further delay. Defendants acted with diligence in putting this 
case to trial. 
As to the fourth factor, it is clear that Defendants would 
have suffered prejudice if the court had acquiesced in allowing 
Plaintiffs to set another trial date. Defendants have incurred 
considerable expense in defending this action. Plaintiffs caused 
delay in failing to complete discovery prior to the original 
discovery cut-off; by moving for a continuance of the original 
trial date in October 2007 over Defendants' opposition; and by 
failing to appear at the trial as scheduled on November 5, 2007. 
Allowing the trial to go forward would have required Defendants 
to subpoena all trial witnesses again. As was explained by Mr. 
Spencer in the hearing of August 20, Defendants may not be able 
to locate all of their witnesses a second time. Another trial 
scheduling would require more trial preparation to again review 
the file and numerous deposition transcripts at length and in 
detail. Finally, and most importantly, there is a suit involving 
Defendant All My Sons that depends on the outcome in this case. 
Further delay not only prejudices that Defendant in the present 
action, but also in the Delaware action. 
Finally, the question of whether injustice would result in 
the dismissal of the action is an equitable determination of 
whether a party whose case is dismissed XNhad ample opportunity 
to litigate his case but abused such opportunity."' Rohan, 2002 
UT 109 at 132; see also Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 240 
(Utah App. 1989) (concluding that the litigant NXhad ample 
opportunity" to litigate his case, but abused the judicial 
process and so the dismissal was justified). As in the 
aforementioned cases, Plaintiffs, had they exercised reasonable 
care in determining the trial dates, would have had their 
opportunity to litigate their case. The court had accommodated 
their schedule several times with impunity. But for Plaintiffs' 
inability to adhere to the schedule of the court, they would 
have been able to litigate their case. The review of the factors 
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shows that the trial court was within its discretion in 
dismissing the action. 
Plaintiffs make several arguments in their brief as to why 
the motion to dismiss was an abuse of discretion. Defendants 
will discuss each one in the following paragraphs, citing to 
their location within Plaintiffs' opening brief. 
Plaintiffs argue that the clients reasonably relied on the 
representations of Mr. Nemelka and thus exercised reasonable 
care in ascertaining the date of trial (Pis. Br. 20-21, 34-35). 
They further argue that the clients are not responsible for what 
their counsel did or did not do (Pis. Br. 21-22), and that the 
trial court's sanctions would punish the clients rather than the 
attorney (pis. br. 31-32). This argument is without basis in 
law. An attorney is an agent of the client, and the attorney's 
lack of diligence is imputed to the client. Walker v. Carlson, 
740 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah App. 1987); see also Russell v. 
Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984); Gardiner & Gardiner 
Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429, 430 (Utah 1982); Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 858 P.2d 193, 194 n.3 (Utah App. 1993); Deschamps v. 
Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 474 n.2 (Utah App. 1989). Whether the 
clients were diligent is not the determinative issue of this 
appeal; the issue is whether Mr. Nemelka exercised reasonable 
care and due diligence in ascertaining the dates of trial such 
that his mistake was reasonable. Also, clients get punished for 
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the negligence of their attorneys all the time. There is also a 
remedy for the clients in this circumstance—a malpractice 
lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs argue that they were justified in relying on an 
order, drafted by Plaintiffs' counsel and signed by the Court 
that included the incorrect dates for trial (Pis. Br. 21, 25, 
33-34). First, Mr. Nemelka does not claim that he actually 
relied upon this order. The record evidence seems to indicate 
that he did not. Second, because the date was not material to 
the order and thus cannot be construed as a ratification or 
endorsement of Mr. Nemelka's mistake. As the court said in its 
ruling (R.644), the order was not a scheduling order and did not 
actually cause confusion. Finally, the order cannot be construed 
as an argument for estoppel as Plaintiffs' counsel wrote the 
order himself. Plaintiffs are trying to claim detrimental 
reliance on what were essentially his counsel's own words, and 
take advantage of a mistake that Plaintiffs invited the court to 
make. To allow Plaintiffs to do this is contrary to the law. Cf. 
Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 51 14-24, 164 P.3d 366 (Explaining 
the invited error doctrine). At most, this is evidence that 
Plaintiffs and their counsel were honestly mistaken about the 
date, an argument that Plaintiffs raise in their brief (Pis. Br. 
22, 23, 30). However, the relevant question is not whether they 
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were honestly mistaken, but whether they were reasonably 
mistaken. 
Plaintiffs argue that because the trial subpoenas sent by 
Defendant were for the dates of November 6 & 7, 2007, it is 
therefore reasonable for Plaintiffs to conclude that the trial 
was to begin on November 6 (Pis. Br. 23, 25). Defendant All My 
Sons subpoenaed witnesses for those dates because it anticipated 
that Plaintiffs' case-in-chief would fill the first day. If Mr. 
Nemelka actually relied upon Defendant's Subpoenas in 
determining the actual dates of the trial, he should have been 
equally curious as to why the Defendant only listed that the 
trial lasted two days. The dates on the subpoenas should have 
raised doubts as to Plaintiffs' recollection rather than 
placating those doubts. In addition, Mr. Ludlow's subpoenas 
should have raised further doubts as to whether Mr. Nemelka 
remembered the trial dates correctly, as he subpoenad a witness 
for November 5, 6, and 7. 
Plaintiffs argue that their mistake in the calendaring was 
there for Defendants and the Court to see and that no one 
explicitly informed them that they were mistaken (Pis. Br. 23-
25, 35). This argument implies that the other parties had a duty 
to .discover Plaintiffs' mistake and correct it for them. That 
conclusion is without foundation and absurd. Plaintiffs never 
claim that the Court or another party affirmatively 
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misrepresented the date of the trial. Plaintiffs do not claim 
that they conducted any research regarding the date or asked a 
direct question about the date. Plaintiffs do not claim that a 
method of ascertaining the correct date was unavailable or even 
inconvenient. Plaintiffs affirm in the record below that Mr. 
Spencer actually informed Mr. Nemelka that he may have been 
mistaken about the dates. Additionally, if Plaintiffs are 
arguing that each document where the incorrect date was used 
should have brought Plaintiffs' mistaken belief to the notice of 
the court and other parties, then it is at least equally true 
that every instance where the correct date was used on the 
pleadings (such as the subpoenas submitted by Mr. Ludlow and the 
trial brief submitted by Mr. Spencer) was an instance that 
Plaintiffs were put on notice that they were mistaken about the 
correct dates. Since no other party had a duty to discover 
Plaintiffs' mistaken belief and Plaintiffs had a duty to act 
with due diligence in discovering the date, this is just further 
reason why Plaintiffs did not act with due diligence. 
Plaintiffs' argument regarding professional courtesy is 
also unavailing (Pis. Br. 25-27). As explained above, 
Plaintiffs' failure to appear on November 5 was not a one-time 
event, but rather a larger pattern of recklessness in 
scheduling. While an attorney should "cooperate in making any 
reasonable adjustments" for a party's failure to appear once 
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because of a scheduling mistake, Utah Code Jud. Admin. 14-301 
(15), when it happens again and again, adjustments for that 
party's schedule are no longer reasonable, and a reasonable 
court or opposing counsel should no longer tolerate the delay. 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the appropriate remedy for 
their failure to appear was to conduct the trial in two days 
(pis. br. 22, 27-30), and that the introduction of deposition 
testimony rather than actual testimony would make it possible 
for a trial to be conducted in two days (pis. br. 28). 
Plaintiffs do not explain how they come to this conclusion, in 
light of the fact that there would have been at least 12 
witnesses proposed to testify. The introduction of two 
depositions in lieu of testimony would still not likely allow 
the trial to be finished in two days. Certainly the lower court 
did not think so, and there is no evidence offered by Plaintiffs 
that would contradict the trial court's discretion on this 
point. It is highly unlikely that the trial would have been able 
to finish in two days without prejudice to Defendants, and 
therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion in 
dismissing the action. 
B. The trial court's denial of the motion to set aside 
was within its discretion. 
The trial court was also within its discretion in denying 
Plaintiffs' motion to set aside the order of dismissal under 
60(b)(1). The Utah Supreme Court has referred to the provisions 
of 60(b)(1) as ''unintentional conduct," Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 
92, f 12, 104 P.3d 1198, and applied to all of them the same 
standard: "if the attorney exercised 'due diLigence' defined as 
conduct that is consistent with the manner in which a reasonably 
prudent attorney under similar circumstances would have acted, a 
judgment may be set aside under 60(b)(1)," Menzies, 2006 UT 81 
at 9[ 72; see also Airkem Intermountam, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 
429, 431 (1973) (To demonstrate that the default was due to 
excusable neglect, "[t]he movant must show that he has used due 
diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by 
circumstances over which he had no control."); State v. 
Wulffenstem, 560 P.2d 331, 335 (Utah 1977) ("For [the Supreme 
Court of Utah] to deem the refusal of the lower court to vacate 
a valid judgment an abuse of discretion, pub]ic policy demands 
more than a mere statement that a person did not have his day in 
court when full opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded to 
him."). Also, in exercising its discretion to grant or deny a 
motion to set aside, a district court should "balance the 
equities on a case-by-case basis, including such considerations 
as the preference to allow the presentation of all claims and 
defenses, any delay or unfairness of a party's conduct, the need 
for finality of judgments, and the respective hardships in 
denying or granting relief." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P. 2d 92, 93 
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n.2 (Utah 1986); See Russell v. Martell, 681 P. 2d 1193; Boyce 
v. Boyce, 609 P. 2d at 931; Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P. 2d 
741 (Utah 1953).5 
As was shown previously, Plaintiffs' mistake did not 
constitute excusable neglect because they did not exercise due 
diligence. Mr. Nemelka did nothing to confirm the correct dates 
of trial, even when put on notice by Mr. Spencer. Mr. Nemelka 
was not presented with any circumstance over which he had no 
control but rather chose to ignore the fact that he had again 
over-scheduled himself. Mr. Nemelka then ignored the information 
furnished to him by Mr. Spencer and failed to make reasonable 
inquiry about the trial schedule. In addition, Defendants would 
5. The rationale for this rule is given m Boyce: 
The difficulty facing the trial court upon a motion to 
vacate the judgment lies in the fact that a compromise 
between two valid considerations must be selected. A 
rule which would permit the re-opening of cases 
previously decided because of error or ignorance 
during the progress of the trial would in a large 
measure vitiate the effects of res judicata and create 
a hardship to the successful litigant m causing him 
to prosecute his action more than once . . . ; on the 
other hand, the court is anxious to protect the losing 
party who has not had the opportunity to present his 
claim or defense. Discretion must be exercised in 
furtherance of justice and the court will incline 
toward granting relief m a doubtful case to the end 
that the party may have a hearing. However, the movant 
must show that he has used due diligence and that he 
was prevented from appearing by circumstances over 
which he had no control. 
Boyce, 609 P.2d at 931. 
have suffered prejudice by setting aside the order, as was 
illustrated above. The trial court was well within its 
discretion in denying the motion to set aside. 
C. The award for attorney fees was within the trial 
court's discretion. 
It is well established that district courts have the 
inherent power to impose sanctions upon a parties or attorneys 
who uby their conduct thwart the court's scheduling and movement 
of cases through the court." Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 
243, 249 (Utah 1993); See Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, n 
12-14, 985 P.2d 255. This power is pursuant to the statutory 
authority given to courts to control proceedings before them. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-2-201 & -218. A court awarding these 
sanctions must make findings of fact that the nature of 
Plaintiffs' conduct warranted the sanction, that the legal 
services performed by the Defendants were necessary, that the 
time devoted to the service was reasonable, and that the hourly 
rate charged was reasonable. Griffith, 1999 UT 78 at ! 14. 
The conduct exhibited by Plaintiffs' counsel justifies 
entering a default judgment and awarding attorney's fees to the 
Defendants. Plaintiffs' conduct shows a clear disregard for the 
schedule of the court and recklessness in conducting the 
litigation. As illustrated above, Plaintiffs' lack of due 
diligence in ascertaining the correct trial date, along with 
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their delay-causing conduct before trial, including failure to 
appear at their own hearings, repeated motions for continuance, 
and obstructionist tactics in discovery, justify the award of 
attorney fees for the whole of the litigation. While the Court 
could merely reschedule the trial and award costs and attorney's 
fees for the Defendants' preparation for trial, it would not 
fully compensate the Defendants for the prejudice suffered by 
the multiple delays, nor would it adequately sanction Plaintiffs 
for the multiple delays and recklessness in conducting the 
litigation to this point. The court's original award is an 
adequate measure to make the Defendants whole and is well within 
the Court's discretion. 
Plaintiffs argue that awarding attorney fees for the 
entirety of the action constituted an error of law (pis. br. 37, 
40). However, Plaintiffs cite no case law to support this 
conclusion. In addition, Plaintiffs admit to the power of the 
court to award fees under its inherent authority. What 
Plaintiffs are contesting is not whether the court has the 
authority to award attorney fees, but whether the court has the 
authority to award the amount of fees that it did. That is a 
question of the lower court's discretion, not a question of law. 
Also, Defendants assert that the trial court's inherent power to 
award attorney fees is co-extensive with a trial court's motion 
to dismiss under Rule 41(d). Compare Barnard, 855 P.2d at 249 
(NN[c] courts of general jurisdiction . . . , possess certain 
inherent power to impose monetary sanctions on attorneys who by 
their conduct thwart the court's scheduling and movement of 
cases through the court"), with Maxfield, 779 P.2d at 239 ([The 
authority to dismiss an action for want of prosecution] is an 
"inherent power" governed not by rule or statute but by the 
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs 
so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of 
cases."). If the lower court has inherent authority to entirely 
dismiss an action entirely, then it must have the authority to 
award attorney fees for the entirety of that action. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the attorney fees were not 
supported by findings (pis. br. 38) and that there was 
specifically no finding of bad faith. A court awarding attorney 
fees under its inherent powers must make findings of fact that 
the nature of Plaintiffs' conduct warranted the sanction, that 
the legal services performed by the Defendants were necessary, 
that the time devoted to the service was reasonable, and that 
the hourly rate charged was reasonable. Griffith, 1999 UT 78 at 
SI 14. This was done in the order denying Plaintiffs' motion to 
set aside (R. at 637-39). No finding of bad faith is necessary 
to award attorney fees under the court's inherent power. 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the amount of the award was 
excessive Pis. Br. 38). However, they give no record evidence 
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that would support that conclusion, nor do they marshal the 
evidence that would support the conclusion. The court does not 
have sufficient evidence to review this question. Also, as 
argued above, Defendants were harmed not only by Plaintiffs' 
failure to appear, but also by their recklessness throughout the 
course of the litigation. There is sufficient evidence in the 
record for the trial court to believe this, and so it is within 
the discretion of the trial court to award fees for the entirety 
of the litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
This court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the 
dismissal of the action, the denial of Plaintiffs' motion for a 
new trial, or the award of attorney fees. In addition, the 
Plaintiffs have failed to marshal or to provide an adequate 
record on appeal, so this Court must accept the conclusions of 
the trial court as correct. Finally, the record evidence shows 
that the trial court was within its discretion in dismissing the 
action, denying Plaintiffs' motions to set aside and for a new 
trial, and the award of attorney fees. This court should affirm 
the judgment of the trial court and award Defendants their 
reasonable attorney fees for Plaintiffs' failure to adequately 
brief the issues on appeal. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of July, 2008. 
m 
Natman Whittaker 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
All My Sons Moving k Storage 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of July, 200f 
RaTidy 
At to rne^- f io^Defendan ts /Appe l lees 
S&B Storage; John Siddoway 
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Randy S. Ludlow #20II 
Attorney for Defendant, 
Jon Siddovvay, dba S & B Storage 
185 South State Street. Suite 208 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841II 
Telephone: (801)531-1300 
Fax'(801) 328-0173 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 0 7 2007 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
B y . 
Deputy Clerk V 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LONNIE PAULOS and ADVANCED 
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS MEDICINE 
LLC. a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALL MY SONS MOVING AND 
STORAGE, business entity, JOHN DOE, 
doing business as All My Sons Moving and 
Storage, and S & B STORAGE, a business 
entity, and JOHN SIDDOWAY, doing 
business as S & B Storage, and JOHN 
DOES J -10, 
Defendant. 
ORDER From TRIAL 
(November 5, 2007) 
Case No. 060903698 
Judge Stephen L. Henxiod 
The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, 
Judge of the above entitled Court on the 5"' day of November, 2007. Neither plaintiffs nor their 
counsel, Richard Ncmelka, were present. Randy S. Ludlow was present on behalf of the 
defendant, Jon Siddoway, who was present, and Stephen Spencer was present on behalf of the 
SIDDOWA V .1 - Oiclei liom Tnal (Novcmbei 5 2007) 
A - l 
defendant, All My Sons Moving and Storage. The Court had attempted to locate the plaintiffs' 
counsel, Richard Nemelka, and was informed thai he was in Bountiful, Utah, attending to 
another matter. The Court had previously rescheduled the trial in order to accommodate the 
request of Mr. Nemelka to attend an event in St. George, Utah. All counsel were personally 
present in Court when the matter was scheduled for the trial to be held November 5-7, 2007 and 
all counsel had agreed to the date and time for trial. Mr. Stephen Spencer had represented to the 
Court thai he personally had contacted Mr. Nemelka's office to make sure that Mr. Nemelka 
would know that the trial was to commence on November 5, 2007 and further had informed Mr. 
Nemelka of the trial date when Mr. Nemelka was hand-delivered a copy of Mr. Spencer's Trial 
Brief. The Court records clearly reflect that the appropriate date was given in the Court Notice. 
The Court having found that the defendants have had to prepare for a three-day trial, which has 
caused them, and to the Court, a significant inconvenience as well as a waste of Court and 
attorney resources; the defendants have continuously alleged that this matter was without merit 
and have requested attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-56, which the 
Court deems appropriate, given the history of this action; further, the Court deems as further 
appropriate that the sanctions to be entered in this matter are to include all attorneys' fees and 
costs as have been incurred by the defendants in this matter; 
Now, based upon the above and good cause appearing herein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Plaintiffs' pleadings are stricken and their claims against the Defendants are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
2. The Defendants are awarded their costs and attorneys' fees as judgment against 
S1DDOWA Y. J - Order fiom Trial (Novcmbci 5. 2007) 2 
A - 2 
the PlamliHs,jointly and severally, upon submission ofan affidavit and corresponding Order for 
the same. 
ENTERED this 7 day of ^CfVtU/jyz^ , 2007. 
BY THE COURT; 
[LTDGB STEPHEN/L. H I I W T O I *>* 
X ^ L AK£ oU 
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I hereby certify on the £> clay of November, 2007, a true and correct copy was 
mailed in the United Stales Mail, postage prepaid, of the foregoing ORDER From TRIAL 
(November 5, 2007) to the following: 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
STEPHEN R. NEMELKA 
6806 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Stephen D. Spencer 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
SHARLA J. WEAVER 
Legal Assistant 
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Randy S. Ludlow #2011 
Attorney foi Defendant, 
Jon Siddoway, dba S & B Storage 
185 South Stale Street. Suite 208 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-1300 
Fax:(801)328-0173 DATE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LONN1E PAULOS and ADVANCED 
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS MEDICINE 
LLC, a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ALL MY SONS MOVING AND 
STORAGE, business entity, JOHN DOE, 
doing business as All My Sons Moving and 
Storage, and S & B STORAGE, a business 
entity, and JON SIDDOWAY, doing 
business as S & B Storage, and JOHN 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
JUDGEMENT 
(on behalf of Jon Siddoway) 
Case No. 060903698 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, 
Judge of the above entitled Court on the 5lh day of November, 2007. Neither plaintiffs nor their 
counsel. Richard Nemelka. were present. Randy S. Ludlow was present on behalf of the 
defendant, Jon Siddoway, who was present, and Stephen Spencer was present on behalf of the 
SIDDOW/U J - Judgement (on behalf of Ion Siddoway) Judgment (on behalf of Jon Siddoway) @J 
A - 4 
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defendant, All My Sons Moving and Sloiage The Courl having found that the defendants have 
had to piepare foi a thiec-day trial, which has caused them, and to the Court a significant 
inconvenience as well as a waste of Courl and attorney lesouices, the defendants have 
continuously alleged thai this mallei was without menl and have iequestcd attorneys* kes 
ptiisuanl to Utah Code Ann Section 78-27-56, which the Court deems appropriate, given the 
history of this action, (urthei, the Courl having determined also thai the sanctions to be entered 
in this mallei aic to include all attorneys' fees and costs as have been inclined by the defendants 
in this matter, the Courl having levicwed the Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs as 
submitted by Randy S Ludlow and having found thai the same arc reasonable, just, and within 
the community standard foi like work and services; 
Now, based upon the above and good cause appearing herein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS. 
1. The Defendant. Jon Siddoway dba as S & B Storage is awarded judgement 
against the Plaintiffs, Lonnie Paulos and Advanced Orthopedic and Sports Medicine LLC. 
jointly and severally, foi his attorney's kts incurred by him in this matter in the amount of 
$11,31400 
2. The Defendant, Jon Siddoway dba as S & B Storage is also awarded his costs 
/ 
/ 
/ (Intentionally left blank) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
SIDDOWAY I - Increment (on behalf of Ion Sicidow.iy) 2 
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mcuned by him against (he Plaintiffs, Lonnic Paulos and Advanced Orthopedic and Sports 
Medicine LLC, jointly and severally, in the amount of $738 41 
ENTERED this ^ d a y o 20( 
BY THE COURT 
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I heieby certify on the day oi Novembei, 2007, a tine and correct copy was 
mailed in the United States Mail, postage picpaid, ofthe foregoing JUDGEMENT (on behalf of 
Jon Siddoway) to the following. 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
STEPHEN R NEMELKA 
6806 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Stephen D. Spencer 
45 East Vine Stieet 
Murray, Utah 84107 
SHARLA J. WEAVER 
Legal Assistant 
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Stephen D.Spencer (8913) 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C. 
Attorney for Defendant (All My Sons Moving and Storage) 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-6800 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
LONNIE PAULOS and ADVANCED 
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS MEDICINE 
LLC, a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ALL MY SONS MOVING AND STORAGE, 
a business entity, JOHN DOE, doing business 
as All My Sons Moving and Storage, and 
S & B STORAGE, a business entity, and 
JOHN SIDDOWAY, doing business as S & B 
Storage, and JOHN DOES 1-10 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
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OF JUDGMENT^ 
DATE. (O\\o^\ <0> 
Cases No. 060903698 
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THIS MATTER came for a bench trial on November 5, 2007, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod 
presiding, whereupon Plaintiffs' complaint was stricken and attorney's fees and costs were awarded to 
defendant All My Sons Moving and Storage as more fully set forth in the Order arising from that date. 
The Court, having ordered that defendant All My Sons Moving and Storage should be awarded its 
attorney's fees and costs; having reviewed the Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs provided by 
counsel for All My Sons Moving and Storage; and having held that the attorney's fees and costs are 
reasonable under the circumstances, hereby enters JUDGMENT against the Plaintiffs as follows 
1. Defendant All My Sons Moving and Storage is granted JUDGMENT in the amount of 
$16,973.60 against the Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, including: Lonnie Paulos; Advanced 
Orthopedics; and Utah Sports Medicine LLC. 
2. Defendant All My Sons Moving and Storage shall file a partial or complete satisfaction 
of judgment as provided by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure upon payment or collection of amounts 
owed. 
DONE this "5 day of ^OMU^^ 2 0 ^ \ UiA  
BY THE COURT: 
SEAL: 
Third District Court Judged ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am an employee or partner of Day Shell & Liljenquist L.C. and that I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, to the following: 
Richard R. Nemelka 
NEMELKA & NEMELKA 
6806 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Randy S. Ludlow 
185 S. State St. #208 
SLC,UT84111 
Court; client 
ON this _ S _ day of November, 2007. [, \ 
mb 
Nathan Whittaker/^^7 
Paralegal for Stephen D. Spencer 
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Stephen D. Spencer (8913) 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C. 
Attorney for Defendant (All My Sons Moving and Storage) 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801)262-6800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
LONNIE PAULOS and ADVANCED 
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS MEDICINE 
LLC, a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ALL MY SONS MOVING AND STORAGE, 
a business entity, JOHN DOE, doing business 
as All My Sons Moving and Storage, and 
S&B STORAGE, a business entity, and 
JOHN SIDDOWAY, doing business as S & B 
Storage, and JOHN DOES 1-10 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL AND 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Cases No. 060903698 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
IN THIS MATTER, Plaintiffs have filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to set aside the Court's Order of 
Dismissal signed November 7, 2006. Plaintiffs also object to the attorney's fees submitted by counsel 
for Defendant S&B Storage. The parties have submitted supporting and opposing memoranda and 
properly noticed the matter pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court, having 
reviewed the motion and the file in this matter, hereby makes findings and orders as follows: <\ 
1. Plaintiffs have failed to show that they exercised dric diligence in ascertaining the trial 
date such that the order dismissing their complaint should be set aside under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah 
A-10 
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Rules of Civil Procedure, nor have they pleaded facts sufficient to set aside the order dismissing the 
complaint under any other subsection of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs' 
motion is therefore DENIED. 
2. It is just and reasonable to award attorney's fees pursuant to this Court's authority to 
control proceedings before it under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-7-5 & -17, to compensate Defendants for 
Plaintiffs' umltipla delays-aafegcklra&ndPfrm conducting this litigation. 
3. The legal services performed by the Defendants were necessary, and the time devoted to 
the services and the hourly rate charged were reasonable. 
4. Plaintiffs' objection to Defendant S&B Storage's attorney's fees fails to articulate a 
reason for their objection and therefore is OVERRULED. 
DATED this ^ b _ day of'\^u^_^ 2008. 
^ BY THE COURT: 
iL^ ' , ~- i, y,' • B f 
Judge S,tepli6nL.:H[ejif-iMK fi ' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am an employee or partner of Day Shell & Liljenquist L.C. and that I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be placed in the United States Mail, first 
class, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Richard R. Nemelka 
NEMELKA & NEMELKA 
6806 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Randy S. Ludlow 
185 S. State St. #208 
SLC,UT84111 
Court; client 
ON this _/^_ day of January, 2008. s~\ /f~T\ JfMn 
Nathan Whittaker ^-^ 
Paralegal to Stephen D. Spencer 
A-l£ 
FJLEE DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 2 6 2008 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LONIE PAULOS and ADVANCED 
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS MEDICINE, 
LLC, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
ALL MY SONS MOVING AND STORAGE, a 
business entity, JOHN DOE, doing 
business as All My Sons Moving and 
Storage, and S&B STORAGE, a 
business entity, and JOHN SIDDOWAY, 
doing business as S&B STORAGE, and 
JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 0 6 0 9 9 0 3 6 9 8 
/)#f 
bQfifuts/Clerk 
Plaintiffs7 Motion for New Trial comes before the Court pursuant to 
Notice to Submit, dated January 25, 2008. 
This Court denied the plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside pursuant to 
Rule 60(b) by Minute Entry, dated January 7, 2008, 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for New Trial on January 11, 2008. The 
reasons submitted in support of said Motion are: 
1 The Court's award of Judgment to the defendants, including 
attorney's fees, is prejudicial to the plaintiff and his attorney. 
A-13 
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2 The failure of the plaintiff to appear in court for trial on 
November 5, 2 007, was due to an honest mistake of Mr. Nemelka. 
3 The Court made a mistake and signed the October 26, 2007, 
Order prepared by Mr. Nemelka indicating that trial was scheduled for 
November 6-8, 2007. 
4 Plaintiff restates his argument that the Court's decision 
should have been set aside pursuant to Rule 6 0(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Mr. Nemelka and the plaintiff state that their conduct in not 
appearing at trial on November 5, 2007, was unintentional. 
There has been no allegation by anyone that the failure of the 
plaintiff and counsel to be ready for trial at the time it was scheduled 
was intentional, or that it was in bad faith. The Court has made no 
ruling that the plaintiff's case is without merit. The fact is that 
trial was set August 20, 2007, in open court with Mr. Nemelka, Mr. 
Spencer and Mr. Ludlow present. It was set for November 5, 6, and 7, 
2007. The reason that trial was set on that date was that Mr. Nemelka 
had filed a Motion asking for a new date from the previously set trial 
date of October 15, so that he could attend and participate in the Utah 
S^ uamer Games in St. George, Utah, on the October date. The November 5 
A-14 
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date was not a good date for Mr. Ludlow, who had to cancel his attendance 
at a continuing legal education conference in order to be at trial, which 
he did, rather than have trial set in 2008 which was the alternative. 
The Order of October 26, 2007, which was prepared by Mr. Nemelka and 
which he says the Court signed by mistake, does refer to trial commencing 
on November 6, but this Order was not and never purported to be a 
Scheduling Order, instead it was an Order allowing the plaintiff to 
present evidence through deposition, rather than having a witness present 
for trial. In the best of all worlds, Mr. Nemelka's error of stating 
that the trial was to commence on November 6 should have been corrected, 
but that Order did not create confusion, nor did it change the trial date 
which had been set for November 5. 
On November 5, 2007, Mr. Spencer and Mr. Ludlow, their clients and 
witnesses appeared, ready for trial at 9:00 a.m., at which time we 
commenced a search for Mr. Nemelka and his client, and found out after 
contacting his office that he was involved in trial in Bountiful, and we 
learned -that he had mistakenly believed trial was supposed to commence 
on November 6. On the 5th in court, Mr. Spencer stated that he had had 
a conversation with Mr. Nemelka the prior week in which he had informed 
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Mr. Nemelka that the trial was going to start on November 5 rather than 
November 6, and that Mr. Nemelka7s belief that trial would start November 
6 was mistaken. 
Mr. Nemelka argues at length that the Court could have started trial 
on November 6 with only relatively minor inconvenience to any of the 
parties. What he doesn't say is that the dates November 5, 6 and 7 were 
arrived at as the only three-day period the Court could accommodate 
before sometime well into 2008, and that a three-day trial started on 
November 6 could not have been completed that week. It would have had 
to be interrupted and couldn't have been finished for weeks. The Court 
had matters set November 8 ^ nd 9 which couldn't be moved. Mr. Nemelka was 
aware of this. 
The only provision of Rule 59 which is relied upon by the plaintiff 
and which could possibly apply to this Motion is Rule 59(a)(1): 
"Irregularity in the proceedings of the court... or any order of the 
court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial." There was no such irregularity in proceedings or 
Court Order, and the plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial is denied, as is 
the plaintiffs' Motion for an Order Staying the Judgment Pending 
Disposition of Motion for New Trial. I have known and respected Mr. 
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Nemelka for more than 30 years and empathize with his and the plaintiff's 
situation, but there is no legal basis to grant his Motion for a New 
Trial. 
This is the final Order of the Court, no further Order need be 
prepared by counsel. 
Dated this J/J day of February, 2008. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Ruling, to the following, this^yjr> day of February, 2008: 
Richard S. Nemelka 
Stephen R. Nemelka 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
6806 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Stephen D. Spencer 
Attorney for Defendant All My Sons Moving 
45 E. Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Randy S. Ludlow 
Attorney for Defendant Siddoway 
185 S. State Street, Suite 208 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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